Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Laws of Nature, philosophy: laws of nature (physical laws) are descriptions of dependencies of physical quantities among each other. From the fact that these are descriptions, it follows that these are no regulations in the sense of e.g. legal regulations. N. Goodman suggests in “Fact, Fiction and Forecast” (1954) that natural laws should be formulated in the form of irreal conditional sentences (also known as counterfactual conditionals); If A were the case, B would have been the case. See also counterfactual conditionals, irreal conditionals, laws, lawlikeness, law statements._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Natural Laws - Dictionary of Arguments
Hempel I 98ff Law of Nature/Wittgenstein: because they cannot be verified completely, they are not statements but only instructions for the formation of statements. >Statements, >Law statements. --- II 99 Laws of Nature/causal necessity/Wittgenstein: the laws of nature are not outside the phenomena - they belong to the language and to our description of things - when ones discusses them, one cannot ignore how they manifest themselves physically. II 131 Justification/laws of nature/Wittgenstein: laws of nature can be justified, rules of grammar not. >Rules, >Grammar, >Justification. II 163 Law of Nature/law/Wittgenstein: 2. Law of Thermodynamics/Wittgenstein: it is not clear a priori that the world continues to lose its order over time. It is a matter of experience. II 164 However, it is not a matter of experience, that it must come to an equal distribution of nuts and raisins, if one whirls them. That something happens with necessity, there is no experience. That one presupposes another force to explain the separation. (For example, specific weight). Laws of nature/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with his laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right nor wrong, but it can be practical or not. Hypotheses like talking of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of the expression. >Hypotheses. Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: we believe it has to do with a law of nature a priori while it is a standard of expression: E.g. So like saying "Actually, everyone is going to Paris, II 165 Although some do not arrive, but all their displacements are preparations for the trip to Paris." --- IV 109 Law of Nature/explanation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6,371 laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena - Tractatus 6,372 So they stay with the laws of nature, like the older with God. IV 105 Law of Causality/Law of Nature/Tractatus: 632 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. >Causal laws. IV 108 Causality/form/show/say/Tractatus: 636 if there were a law of causality, it might be: "There are laws of nature". But one cannot say that, it turns out. >Causality, >Causal explanation. --- Tetens VII 122 Civilization/WittgensteinVsCivilization/WittgensteinVsModernity/Tetens: believes he can explain everything and thinks all important is explained once the facts are scientifically explained in principle. It is an illusion that the world is explained when we know the laws of nature. >Explanation. VII 123 Definition laws of nature/Tractatus/Tetens: are the truth functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. Neither through logic nor through the laws of nature. The laws of nature also not explain natural phenomena. (> Tractatus 6.317). VII 124 The laws of nature are also not the last. That is the logical space, the space of all possible distributions of truth values to the elementary propositions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich, München 1982 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Natural Laws
